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Soweto hardly needs an introduction. An iconic township, it's name reverberates through South African political history and is known internationally.
1 Th e City of Johannesburg's report Remaking of Soweto provides a quantitative description that can serve as a prologue to this chapter:
Soweto's population is offi cially estimated at approximately 1.3 million, with between 600 000 and a million people in the township regarded as living in abject poverty. Th e township covers an area of approximately 150 km², just more than 9% of the 1 644 km² of the City of Johannesburg, and according to offi cial sources, is home to 43% of the City of Johannesburg's population. It has an estimated density of approximately 8 667 people/km² compared to the 1 962 people/km² for the whole City area. (CoJ 2011: 2) 2 It is impossible to unravel the complex entanglement of society, politics, economics and environment that is continually shaping the production and reproduction of space across Soweto in this chapter. We do, however, provide a synoptic overview of spatial processes post-1994, and we locate this account within a tradition of writing on Soweto that goes back to the 1960s.
In common with earlier writers, we focus on the diff erentiated nature of Soweto's social and spatial landscape -Soweto cannot be spoken of in generic or generalised terms. We also try to provide a balanced and analytical perspective on more recent transformations in Soweto. Th e Remaking of Soweto is a glowing account of Soweto's makeover that celebrates Amos Masondo's ten-year stint as executive mayor of the City of Johannesburg. Th e
The most comprehensive account of Soweto's history from a political economy perspective was Bonner and Segal's Soweto: A History (1998) . It revealed how present-day Soweto is shaped by an intricately layered history. Soweto had its origins in 1905 when the slum yards of Newtown in central Johannesburg were razed to the ground and African residents were moved to Pimville (initially known as Klipspruit). This was a small, isolated settlement until the 1930s when Orlando was constructed as a 'model township' . In the 1940s the Jabavu and Moroka Emergency Camps were developed as ostensibly transient accommodation for squatters. Dube was built by the Johannesburg City Council in the mid 1950s as a middle-class township while Meadowlands and Diepkloof were constructed by central government to receive households relocated from Sophiatown and surrounding areas. Then came the relocations from Eastern Native Township and George Goch into the townships of Emdeni, Senaone and Zola, and also the development of hostels from the late 1950s to accommodate migrant workers. This rapid expansion came to an end in the late 1960s as government put a freeze on new township housing, but was resumed again in the late 1980s after influx control was lifted. Bonner and Segal (1998) also explained the ethnic zoning within Soweto -Naledi, Mapetla, Tladi, Moletsane and Phiri were developed for Sesotho-and Setswana-speaking people; Chiawelo for the Tsonga and Venda; and Dlamini, Zola, Zondi, Jabulani and Emdeni for isiXhosa and isiZulu speakers. The hostels were also ethnically divided. Significantly, it was only in 1963 that the sprawl of townships was given a single identity with the overarching name 'Soweto' (an acronym for South Western Townships; see Figure 15 .1).
It is clear from Bonner and Segal's account that much of the complexity and differentiation of present-day Soweto is derived from its early history. They also explain, however, how differentiation has expanded over time. For example, during the economic boom of the 1960s a growing number of Soweto residents moved into better paid jobs, although many residents remained in deep poverty. This differentiation extended in the 1980s when PW Botha's administration deliberately sought to create a stable black middle class as a buffer against the radicalising youth. This differentiation was reflected in housing and housing policy. In the 1980s, the emergent middle class was granted 99-year leasehold rights (and, eventually, full freehold title). Upmarket townships were built, including Orlando West (known as 'Beverley Hills') and the Diepkloof extensions.
Bonner and Segal also referred to the emergence of 'new second class citizens' in the 1980s as the repeal of pass laws allowed for new migrants from poor rural areas to move into Soweto. Many of these migrants moved into shack settlements which grew 'at a staggering rate ' (1998: 134) . They wrote that: By 1989, there were an estimated 42 374 shacks in the township, and the face of Soweto was transformed. On every available piece of land stood groups of hovels and makeshift shelters. (Bonner and Segal 1998: 134) A number of other scholars have elaborated on Bonner and Segal's account of growing socio-spatial differentiation in Soweto. Parnell (1991) explored middle-class formation in the early days of Soweto with reference to the creation of Dube as an elite residential area. Beall et al. (2002 Beall et al. ( , 2003 explored socio-spatial differentiation in Orlando East and Meadowlands where the original matchbox houses were transformed almost beyond recognition as a result of growing internal socio-spatial differentiation, and where the emergence of backyard shacks on the properties of house owners placed different social groups into immediate proximity.
Economic geographers pointed to processes of labour market and class differentiation: Turok (1994) showed how business began to develop in Soweto from the 1980s as the multiple mechanisms regulating black-owned business were gradually removed; Khosa (1992) explained the meteoric rise of the black taxi industry in the 1980s; while De Montille (1987) described the growing differentiation within the informal sector between survivalist enterprises and successful business such as the taxi industry.
Cultural historians and geographers took a different angle on differentiation. Pirie (1984) used the cadastral and geographical names within Soweto to illustrate diversity while Hart (1986) provided a literary geography of Soweto, revealing how poetry and novels capture the texture of place in a way that conventional academic writing could never. Importantly, she drew attention to the writing of the so-called Soweto poets, a loose grouping of black authors who wrote in the wake of the Soweto uprising within a tradition of black consciousness.
5 This work fell outside the conventions of academic writing but was an important counterpoint to university scholarship that remained almost entirely dominated by white academics. Ntshangase (2002) was one of the rare contributions to the academic literature on Soweto by an African author. He argued that the two different forms of township slang in Soweto, flaaitaal and iscamtho, reflected the diverse histories of urbanisation within the townships. Glaser (2000) provided a spatially textured account of the rise of youth gangs in Soweto from the 1950s to the 1970s, observing that it was in the slightly older, better-off townships in the north and north-east of Soweto, rather than in the poorer townships of the south-west, that gangs first developed as it was there that territorial and social bonds were strongest.
Processes of socio-spatial differentiation after 1994
There is a literature that points to continued, even accelerated, processes of differentiation post-1994. Morris et al. (1999) reported on an extensive social survey which revealed significant social differences by accommodation type (council houses, private-sector houses, backyard shacks, informal settlements and hostels) in the late 1990s.
6 Crankshaw et al. (2000) used survey data to reveal the sharp differences between home owners and occupiers of backyard shacks. The former lived mainly in family units of some form, had a house as a capital asset and were linked into strong social networks. The latter comprised mainly socially marginal single males who had recently arrived in the city. Crankshaw et al. revealed that the growth of backyard shacks accelerated into the 1990s as the African National Congress (ANC)-led government continued a policy of 'turning South Africa into a nation of homeowners', forcing households in need of rental accommodation to turn to informal markets (2000: 844) .
Cultural studies, which merged in writing on Johannesburg with postcolonial theory, emphasised the need to move away from generalised discussions of township poverty and urban inequality to 'postliberation ethnographies of everyday life in the township' that challenge the 'negative definition of this highly syncretic urban formation' (Mbembe et al. 2004: 239) . The best-known contribution was Jacob Dlamini's book, Native Nostalgia (2009), but this dealt with townships on the East Rand rather than Soweto. Mbembe et al. (2004) , however, used a conversation with two young black residents of Soweto to explore the new aesthetic forms that are shaping the rhythms of life in post-1994 townships.
The socio-spatial differentiation of Soweto post-1994 is represented in various official reports, including the city's Economic Activity Analysis for Soweto (CoJ 2003) and Soweto Retail Strategy (CoJ 2005a) . The most intricate spatial representation of differentiation in Soweto comes from the city's 2011 mapping of deprivation indices (see Plate 13 in the colour section). It reveals that Soweto -perhaps more so than any other part of the city -is a variegated patchwork of different levels of deprivation.
The publication of Alexander et al. 's Class in Soweto (2013) added new dimensions to the understanding of differentiated class formation and class structure in Soweto. The book characterises Soweto in terms of 'differentiated proletarian unity':
By 'proletarian' we wish to convey important social ties linking workers with the unemployed, underemployed, pensioners and most students. 'Differentiation' occurs along various axes. These include variation in employment status; the households of workers, for instance, being better off materially than those of partial workers and the unemployed; quality of housing, education and lifestyle; class identity; and capacity to mobilise for change. Gender and age are also important -in relation to family conflicts, as well as to popular culture and political activity. (2013: 235) The book revealed a high degree of 'class ambivalence' in Soweto, with multiple class identities, and also with very little correspondence between self-ascribed middle-class identities and what is commonly regarded in the literature as being middle class. Although a high proportion of residents label themselves as 'middle class', Alexander et al. consider Soweto to be a primarily proletarian township, with an important distinction between the 'workers' and the 'poor' (the partially employed and the unemployed ) which plays out in the everyday politics of the township.
Analysing spatial change in Soweto post-1994 Public investment in the shaping of Soweto
Remaking of Soweto (CoJ 2011) argues that public investment (and the private investment this has leveraged) has fundamentally transformed Soweto's physical landscape and also hugely improved the daily lives of Soweto's residents. In the account below we show that this is true in important respects but that public investment in Soweto has had complex and diverse outcomes. This is revealed also by Wafer (2012) , who explores the complex relationships between the expectations of post-apartheid citizens living in Soweto and the delivery of infrastructure by the state.
1990-2000: an overview
Much of the visible transformation of Soweto since the ending of apartheid happened after the formation of the single-tier metropolitan authority for Johannesburg in December 2000, but the parameters for recent developments were set in the 1990s.
On 24 September 1990, the all-white Johannesburg City Council signed an agreement with community structures in Soweto that was known as the Soweto Accord and that led to the establishment of the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber. The Accord was followed by a lengthy process of deliberation and bargaining that led to the establishment of a two-tier metropolitan authority in 1996 and eventually to the formation of the single-tier authority. During this process of convoluted transition the focus was largely on institutional transformations and on setting in place new policies, so there was relatively little tangible development in places like Soweto. The financial crisis in Johannesburg, which led to the near collapse of local government in the late 1990s, made it especially difficult to implement capital development programmes (CoJ 2001).
However, two major spatial developments in this period had a lasting impact on the development of Greater Soweto. The first was the development of 'less formal townships' on the mining belt to the north-west of Soweto and the second was the initiation of the Baralink Regeneration Project.
In the early 1990s the area north-west of Soweto fell under the administration of the Roodepoort City Council, which was under great political pressure to provide low-cost housing. The Council identified land for housing within the mining belt, which was conveniently separated from white suburbs by vacant land, slime dams and mine dumps. The proposed housing development also provided a solution for mining companies which had been left with large swathes of derelict land after the closure of the mines. The Less Formal Township Establishment Act (No. 113 of 1991) was used to fast-track this development.
Although planning for the less formal townships commenced before the establishment of transitional local authorities in 1996, the developments mainly happened after 1996, providing a boost for the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) with its ambitious targets for the delivery of housing units. In the 1990s and into the early 2000s, a slew of new townships were created across the mining belt north-west of Soweto, including Bram Fischerville, Thulani, Slovoville, Matholesville, Tshepisong and Leratong Village (Figure 15 .2). These areas had a lower level of servicing than other townships, and housed a very poor population of fairly recent migrants to the city that had previously lived in informal settlements and backyard shacks. Some of the townships took the form of siteand-service schemes and were barely distinguishable from shack settlements as their top structures were mainly informal.
The biggest development was Bram Fischerville where Brett Kebble's Rand Lease Properties constructed around 24 000 housing units on derelict mining land. This development provided a convenient reception area for households relocated from elsewhere in the city. For example, more than 2 000 households were relocated from the banks of the Jukskei River in Alexandra to Bram Fischerville, followed shortly afterwards by around 300 households from Phiri in Soweto. 7 As indicated in the city's mapping of deprivation indices, these less formal townships are ghettoes of poverty. The spatial effect of these developments was to expand the footprint of Soweto away from Johannesburg towards the West Rand. It exacerbated spatial fragmentation as the new townships were scattered across old mining land, separated from each other and generally poorly connected south into Soweto or north into Roodepoort.
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The Baralink Regeneration Project, by contrast, was an explicit attempt to achieve spatial integration. Baralink, located on vacant land on the eastern edge of Diepkloof, and surrounding Soweto's largest transport interchange, offered a rare opportunity to bring together the previously separated cities of Soweto and Johannesburg. Baralink was initiated in 1993 by the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber as an urban reconstruction project. Baralink was to be developed as the main 'Gateway to Soweto' and as a regionalscale multimodal hub, and was to include a large mixed-use and recreational development centred on Orlando Dam (Orlando Ekhaya); a cluster of residential, commercial, medical and office facilities (Bara Central); the formalisation and upgrading of the Elias Motsoaledi informal settlement; the redevelopment of the Diepkloof Hostel for around 2 000 family units; and the construction of a large multimodal transport facility and traders' market at Baragwanath.
The Baralink initiative was ambitious and complex, with projects proposed on 15 designated land parcels, and it took time before implementation could commence. In 1999 business plans were completed but it was only around 2005 that development was visibly evident in the area. The planning for Baralink was, however, important in shaping the idea of comprehensive area-based development that was to inform later initiatives such as the Greater Kliptown Development Project. compelled the city to more marginal areas while the costs of the World Cup and the effects of the global financial crisis led to an overall decline in capital expenditure available for marginalised areas.
Not all development required capital expenditure. The physical development of Soweto was supported by a land regularisation programme which involved the formalisation of property rights across Soweto, and was also supported by a series of annual cultural events.
14 Although the city took the lead in the development of Soweto, it was supported by other spheres of government. Provincial government identified large new housing projects around Soweto and included the Soweto townships of Orlando and Zola in its R3 billion Top Twenty Townships Programme. 15 The National Treasury assisted the city with disbursements through the Neighbourhood Development Partnership Grant (NDPG) for the development of Soweto. 16 The high levels of investment in Soweto produced political dividends. Soweto remained a stronghold of the ANC with the City of Johannesburg's annual Citizen Satisfaction Survey revealing levels of satisfaction in Soweto higher than in any other region of the city.
17 However, the benefits of development were clearly uneven and there were ongoing conflicts between authorities and communities in the poorest areas, mainly on the spatial margins of Soweto. Flashpoints included Phiri, where there was bitter conflict over the city's introduction of prepaid water meters, 18 and Kliptown, Protea South and Freedom Park, where shack dwellers battled authorities over plans to relocate informal settlements or over delays in the provision of houses and services (Wafer 2012) .
Event-led development
The focus on Soweto post-2000 was arguably driven by the immense political importance of the Soweto constituency to the governing party in the Johannesburg City Council. Soweto was able to draw resources in a way that Diepsloot or Orange Farm or Ivory Park could not. However, the immediate catalysts for development in Soweto were three large events held entirely or partly in Johannesburg This success also inspired the launch of the Soweto Gravel Roads Project in 2003, which became a defining intervention for the Masondo administration. The R500 million programme took just two years to complete and involved the tarring and upgrading of 314 km of dirt and gravel roads (CoJ 2005b) . Remaking of Soweto called this project a 'game-changer' which 'gave the township the look and feel of urban South Africa as visible as the former white suburbs of Johannesburg' (CoJ 2011: 59) .
The 50th anniversary of the Congress of the People also focused the minds of provincial and local politicians, as Kliptown -where the Congress was held in 1955 -was a neglected and degraded environment, hardly an auspicious site at which to host a great celebration of the achievements of democracy. The Greater Kliptown Development Project was launched in 2001 under the ambit of the provincial government's Blue IQ with the city's Johannesburg Development Agency as the implementing agent (Kuljian 2008) . Like Baralink, this project was ambitious, involving the construction of a grand monument to the Congress of the People, as well as the development of a fully integrated and upgraded residential and economic precinct in an area where more than 48 000 people live in informal settlements. The Walter Sisulu Square of Dedication was completed, together with an international hotel, in time for the 50th anniversary, but housing development and informal settlement upgrading has been slower than anticipated, provoking community anger and occasional unrest (see Chapter 16).
The largest event by far was the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In 2004, South Africa was selected as the host nation, and in the years that followed there was frantic preparation for the grand event. The biggest task was the construction and upgrading of stadiums. South Africa's premier match venue, Soccer City (NASREC), is immediately adjacent to Soweto while the Orlando and Dobsonville stadiums within Soweto were upgraded as training venues.
Apart from the stadiums, the largest intervention in preparation for the event was the development of a new system of public transport, of which Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) became the flagship (see chapters 4, 5, 10 and 22, this volume). The BRT began operation in August 2009 in the face of concerted opposition from segments of the taxi industry. The residents of Soweto were major beneficiaries of the early construction of the BRT. The routes developed in Phase 1A (launched in August 2009) and 1B (launched in October 2013) both connect Soweto to inner-city Johannesburg.
Soweto benefited in other ways too from the World Cup. Mayor Masondo argued that the World Cup should not only produce the physical infrastructure for the games but also provide lasting benefit for local communities. 19 In 2006 Masondo launched a R1 billion Legacy Projects Initiative and again Soweto benefited disproportionately with six of the seven legacy projects relating wholly or in part to Soweto. 20 By 2008 Soweto had no fewer than 13 major city-funded development initiatives, of which about half were World Cup linked.
Nodal development
The key spatial concept underlying public-sector intervention in Soweto was 'nodal development' . It was clearly articulated in the Soweto Retail Strategy of 2004 and was taken forward in the Soweto Integrated Spatial Development Framework of 2008. A number of nodes were identified but the key ones for development interventions were Baralink, Kliptown and Jabulani. The first two were the object of the earliest area-based initiatives after 1994, and their development has progressed, although more slowly and fitfully than initially anticipated. In Baralink, for example, a multimodal transport interchange and shopping centre has been completed, together with major road and university campus upgrades, but the long-awaited Orlando Ekhaya development is developing very slowly. 21 The third node is newer and more vibrant than the other two, and its development was catalysed by a major private investment -the Jabulani Mall, which was opened in 2006. Jabulani had long been spoken of as Soweto's CBD but had attracted little investment development. However, with the arrival of the mall, the city confidently projected the development of Jabulani centre as a fully fledged residential, business and recreational node. Apart from the mall, it was to have a hospital, a theatre, multi-storey residential units, a technical college, a public square and a civic centre. To date, there has been good progress with the development of Jabulani through an expanding partnership between the public and private sectors, and the theatre and multi-storey residential units are now complete.
A smaller node of public investment was the Johannesburg Development Agency-driven Vilakazi Street Precinct Upgrade, which followed the opening of the Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum in 2002 and which has reinforced the emergent role of Soweto as a centre of heritage and tourism. 22 
Housing and informal settlements
Although there was far more diversity in development projects after 2000 than ever before, state investment in housing continued to be a major driver of spatial change. Initially, there was little strategy behind housing interventions, with the government responding mainly in an ad hoc fashion to community demands.
City government, for example, came under strong pressure from township residents in the relatively affluent Diepkloof to remove the Mandelaville informal settlement, which was prominently situated in the centre of the township. In 2002 the city used the notorious 'red ants' (Wozani Security Company) to relocate Mandelaville shack dwellers to an old mining hostel north of Bram Fischerville, which became the core of a settlement known as Sol Plaatje. The shacks were razed and the land was reallocated for the development of a shopping mall and upmarket townhouses but the city came under sharp criticism for its action, including from the Human Rights Commission (Murray 2008) .
A more systematic attempt to eradicate informal settlements and replace shacks with formal RDP-type houses soon emerged, championed by the provincial MEC for Housing, Nomvula Mokonyane (later provincial premier). Although Soweto accounted for only around 15 per cent of Johannesburg's informal settlements, the area received disproportionate attention as the well-established and politically connected township communities lobbied authorities to remove shack dwellers. The major stumbling block for the eradication drive was, however, the lack of alternative accommodation for the shack haRRiSOn anD haRRiSOn • SOCiO-SpatiaL DiFFeRentiatiOn in SOWetO 305 dwellers. In 2004, the City of Johannesburg released its Housing Master Plan showing how eradication could be achieved.
The development of Lehae (originally known as Vlakfontein), a state-subsidised housing estate to the south of Soweto, was central to achieving the eradication objective. This was the typical greenfields development on the urban periphery, originally developed for shack dwellers from Tembalihle, a settlement on dolomitic land in Lenasia. However, after strong resistance to relocation from the residents of this settlement, Lehae became available to accommodate shack dwellers from settlements across Soweto. After the development of Lehae Phase One in 2004, the eradication programme proceeded but took longer than anticipated due to funding cuts and complex negotiations with communities. In October 2011 a number of informal settlements across Soweto were cleared and their residents moved to Lehae. 23 From around 2008 the city accepted that some settlements would be upgraded in situ as part of a new informal settlement regularisation programme, in addition to the few settlements earlier earmarked for formalisation as part of Baralink and other programmes. The Elias Motsoaledi informal settlement had been earmarked for formalisation as part of the Baralink Development Project since the 1990s. The long delay in implementing the Elias Motsoaledi informal settlement upgrade in Baralink provoked violent street protests in 2009, but the housing project on site eventually commenced in April 2011. At about the same time Freedom Park informal settlement in Devland was upgraded as part of the 'Golden Triangle development', but also after community protests.
By the end of 2011 very few (non-upgraded) free-standing informal settlements remained in the historic core of Soweto. 24 However, on the southern edge of Soweto, informal settlements were expanding and severe tensions remained in respect to state programmes to relocate or formalise settlements.
In Protea South -adjoining a modern new shopping centre and middle-class housingthere are more than 6 000 households living in shacks. The initial plans were to upgrade the settlement in situ but when the area was assessed as being dolomitic and at risk of sinkhole formation, the community was earmarked for relocation to Doornkop (now called Lufhereng), west of Soweto. The community objected and protests organised by the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Landless Peoples Movement erupted in 2002. There were further protests between 2007 and 2008, and in 2013, and also violent clashes between the residents of bonded houses in the area and shack dwellers.
The situation in Kliptown, where more than 48 000 households live in shacks, was equally contested (see Chapter 16). In 2007, the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Landless Peoples Movement mobilised shack dwellers in the area, organising large-scale protests. In August 2008 the townhouses built on the Pimville golf course were illegally occupied by shack dwellers who were deeply frustrated at the delays in providing housing, and violent protests erupted once again in 2013.
While the focus was on the eradication of free-standing informal settlements, there was also an attempt to reduce the numbers of backyard shacks through the Gauteng Top Twenty Townships Programme, launched in 2005. The Programme stalled in 2009 due to lack of funding and had little if any impact on the prevalence of shacks.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the shack eradication programme has contributed to further spatial fragmentation, and has shifted the urban poor to more marginal places. This was evident in the case of the relocation from Diepkloof to Sol Plaatje, with Wilson (2006) pointing to the significantly increased transport costs and expanded livelihood challenges faced by the relocated households. It is also evident in the various relocations from informal settlements within Soweto to Lehae.
The national Department of Housing revised its policy in 2004, in response to growing critique, with the launch of Breaking New Ground (BNG). The policy proposed 'utilising housing as an instrument for the development of sustainable human settlements, in support of spatial restructuring' (Department of Housing 2004) . The critical question is to what extent the introduction of BNG has made a real difference on the ground in places like Soweto. BNG clearly could not immediately transform the spatial location and form of housing development as many housing schemes were already in the project cycle. Developments, including Bram Fischerville and Lehae, continued to expand after 2004, reinforcing spatial decisions made prior to the policy shift.
There is, however, evidence that some of the post-2004 developments have taken account of BNG principles. The best example is perhaps the Pennyville development which was well located next to the New Canada train station, and which included a variety of housing typologies and tenure types to accommodate a mix of incomes and social groups. 25 The continued conversion of single-sex hostels into integrated family units has also assisted positively in changing Soweto's physical and social landscape, while Joshco has pioneered the development of rental units as part of mixed-use developments.
The largest new housing development in Soweto after 2004, however, has outcomes that are deeply ambiguous in relation to BNG. The Lufhereng development at Doornkop to the west of Soweto is a large development, with more than 24 000 housing units planned at an anticipated cost of around R4 billion. 26 The project is planned as a mixed-use and mixedtenure development, and includes a large urban agriculture component that supports an integrated agribusiness value chain. Despite the clearly positive and innovative elements in this project, Lufhereng further extends Soweto in a direction away from the economic core of the city.
Integration of planning
Given the divergent and spatially contradictory outcomes illustrated above, it is necessary to ask whether there were coherent frameworks guiding Soweto's development post-liberation. Area-based initiatives such as Baralink and Kliptown were an attempt to ensure integration within specific localities. For example, a Baralink Co-ordination Committee was established to provide co-ordination for the initiative, although development to date has been patchy and it remains to be seen whether the area will develop as a spatially coherent node.
There have also been attempts to achieve integration for Soweto as a whole. In 2004, the Soweto Development Initiative was launched by the city's Economic Development Unit to co-ordinate development initiatives in Soweto, and an area-based Council Committee was set up for oversight. 27 This initiative failed to achieve its objective of integrating all Sowetobased initiatives, mainly as a result of political factionalism within the ANC during Mayor Masondo's second term in office and institutional rivalries within the city bureaucracy.
There were other attempts to provide overarching development frameworks, including the Soweto Investment Framework of 2005 and the Soweto Integrated Spatial Development Framework of 2008. The outcomes of these frameworks and plans have yet to be assessed. The most recent initiative is the 'Corridors of Freedom', which draws on principles of transit-oriented development to integrate the city, with a BRT route between Soweto and the inner city as one of the integrating corridors (see Chapters 4 and 5).
Private investment in the shaping of Soweto
Soweto is largely a product of state housing policy, and despite the introduction of some private-sector housing estates, state-funded housing remains the overwhelmingly dominant influence on the spatial configuration of the townships. However, a perception reflected in the media and in government reports is that Soweto is attracting private-sector investment and that this is becoming a growing force in township development. Our analysis suggests that Soweto has a long way to go before it receives its proportionate share of private-sector investment.
The biggest story in relation to private investment is retail, with Wafer (2012) , for example, referring to post-apartheid investments in Soweto in terms of an emergent 'consumer citizenship' . Given the severe restrictions on retail development in Soweto under apartheid, this sector was historically underdeveloped. The city's Economic Activity Analysis for Soweto (CoJ 2003: 3) estimated that 80 per cent of Soweto's disposable income was spent outside of the townships, explaining that 'this high degree of leakage results in a very low internal circulation of money, and therefore a very small multiplier effect' .
In 1994, Colliers International financed the 18 000 m 2 Dobsonville Mall, but even with this development the retail space approved for Soweto in the 1990s was only 1 per cent of the space approved for Sandton. By 2004, Soweto still only accounted for 1.6 per cent of Johannesburg's formal retail space (Viruly Consulting 2004) .
At that time, however, Soweto was on the cusp of a short but spectacular retail boom. The City of Johannesburg's Soweto Retail Strategy (CoJ 2005a) thrilled the business media with its reference to massive pent-up demand for retail space in Soweto. It estimated that retail spending within Soweto could increase from 25 per cent to 50 per cent, and that the market could therefore support an additional 70 000 m 2 of retail space by 2010. Even as the report was released early in 2005 there were plans at advanced stages to build no less than an additional 140 000 m 2 of retail space. 28 The Protea Gardens Shopping Centre opened in 2005 and the Jabulani and Bara malls were opened in 2006. The biggest development came in 2007 with the 65 000 m 2 Maponya Mall, a partnership between the veteran Sowetan businessman, Richard Maponya and specialist financiers, Investec.
In April 2007 a Financial Mail reporter wrote excitedly that 'SA's national retailers are rushing to fill an explosion of shop space in Soweto', referring to 'an economic awakening in the township' (Hlengani 2007) . This was, however, the crest of the retail boom. The new malls quickly mopped up pent-up demand and were soon struggling to maintain market thresholds. Further retail developments such as Orlando Ekhaya and Diepkloof Plaza were delayed and the Maponya Mall did not do as well as anticipated. 29 By 2011, there was further retail development with the opening of the 30 000 m 2 Protea Glen Shopping Centre, although this was a specific market response to the development of around 20 000 new housing units to the west of Soweto.
The effect of the malls on small business and informal activity in Soweto is an area of debate. Ligthelm (2010) reports on a longitudinal study of around 300 firms within a 5 km radius of the new Jabulani Mall. It revealed that within the first year after the mall was opened, 38 per cent of small businesses in the vicinity shut down, a percentage increasing to 48 per cent within two years. 30 Apart from the shopping malls, the other very obvious new structures are the churches, reflecting the growing role of religion within the townships, and also the arrival of religious entrepreneurs from countries including Brazil and Nigeria. There is a plethora of new church buildings, including the mega structures of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and the Grace Bible Church.
Parts of Soweto have 'suburbanised' with the development of private housing estates. As early as the 1970s, the black middle class was building private homes in places like Orlando West Extension, Rockville and Dube South, and the process accelerated in the 1980s with the construction of private housing estates in the Diepkloof extensions. At the time the black middle class was still confined to the townships and these were their preferred neighbourhoods.
After 1994, with the removal of discriminatory practices and the introduction of black economic empowerment, the black middle class expanded quickly and also moved out of the townships into previously white suburbs. This would have curbed middle-class housing development within Soweto but for the rise of an aspiring middle class which could not yet afford suburban living. The major new developments catering to this market are to the east of Soweto around Naturena and Devland, and to the west at Protea Glen. Houses in these developments typically sell for between R400 000 and R500 000 and are targeted mainly at upwardly mobile first-time buyers. The impact of these new developments on spatial form is mixed. The developments to the east link Soweto to the southern suburbs (see Chapter 14) but Protea Glen is poorly located in the metropolitan contexts. Over the past decade, an affordable housing company, Calgro M3, pioneered a new generation of well-located and socially mixed affordable housing developments. This was the developer for Pennyville, which subsequently also developed the mixed-income, mixed-tenure development at Fleurhof, on previous mining land between Soweto and Roodepoort, and walk-up flats in Jabulani CBD as part of the mixed-use nodal development (Malherbe 2011 ).
There was hype around the performance of the residential property market in Soweto, especially around the time of the retail boom, but the real performance has been subdued. In almost all of Soweto's 27 townships, the average annual turnover of properties through formal sales (i.e. 'the churn') is less than 1 per cent. The only significant activity is in the new aspirational middle-class townships: Protea Glen and Naturena are performing best, with churns of 2.9 per cent and 3.4 per cent respectively.
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In the period 2004-2011, 57 per cent of all sales in Soweto came from Protea Glen, Devland and Naturena, with 38 per cent from Protea Glen alone. 32 In the poorer parts of Soweto there were very few formal transactions, but even in more established areas, such as Orlando, Meadowlands and Dube, the turnover of properties was low. Rather than expanding, the formal housing market in Soweto has contracted, with the number of formal property transactions annually in Soweto dropping precipitously from around 12 500 in 2004 to a mere 1 900 in 2010. 33 This of course happened in a context when the property market nationally was in decline, and many transactions may have happened informally, so we should avoid specific conclusions about Soweto until further data are available.
Beyond retail, religion and housing, there has been relatively little private development. The Economic Activity Analysis for Soweto reported that 'Soweto has no economic base of its own, and its main economic function is to provide labour to the various industries located in the rest of the Johannesburg Metropole' (CoJ 2003: 13) . Despite having 40 per cent or so of Johannesburg's population, Soweto contributed only 4 per cent of the city's Gross Value Added and that mainly in the community services sector. Since then, the formal retail economy has expanded in Soweto but few other sectors have shown dynamism. An indication of this is that there were only 156 rezoning applications in Soweto between 2006 and 2010, accounting for only 3 per cent of the total for Johannesburg as a whole, less than the 4 per cent contribution of the Soweto economy to Johannesburg (CoJ 2010 (CoJ /2011 ). This figure must be used cautiously, however, as Soweto does have a large informal economy and many businesses and land-use changes may not go through the formal regulatory processes.
There has been some hype around the tourism industry but Soweto still contributes less than 1 per cent of the tourism Gross Value Added in South Africa, with most tourist activity involving day tours of the townships. 34 Manufacturing makes a small contribution to Soweto's economy. There are a few hectares of underutilised land zoned for industry in Chiawelo, Dlamini and Emdeni, and on the edge of Soweto are the Devland and Nancefield industrial estates. These estates are well located relative to the freeway network and to the large labour pool in Soweto, but their performance has been modest, raising again the question of why the market remains wary of investing in and around Soweto. 35 The City of Johannesburg is trying to support new industrial formation by developing the Soweto Empowerment Zone within the Baralink precinct, but this initiative has progressed slowly with planning commenced in 2004 and the official launch happening only in October 2010. 36 There has been very little development of private office space in Soweto. The Orlando Ekhaya development has made provision for offices but it remains to be seen what the take-up will be. The informal sector provides a livelihood cushion for many of Soweto's poorest but also remains relatively undeveloped with most activity in low-order retail, although there has been some expansion into areas like tourism (Rogerson 2008) .
A stable core and a fractious periphery?
We cannot speak generically of Soweto's post-apartheid transformation, as Soweto is clearly an urban agglomeration with considerable socio-spatial differentiation. At first glance, we might distinguish between a relatively stable historic core of Soweto, centred on townships such as Orlando West, Orlando East, Dobsonville, Dube, Jabavu and Moroka, and a fractious edge with a complex mix of informal settlements, new state-subsidised housing, and privately provided housing for the emergent middle class. The picture is, however, more complex than this. A full analysis of the multiple townships in Soweto is beyond the scope of this study but we illustrate the complexity through a comparison between four townships in the 'core' (Dobsonville, Orlando East, Dube and Jabavu) and four townships on the 'periphery' (Bram Fischerville Ext. 7, Kliptown, Protea Glen, Protea South) (see the Annexure at the end of the chapter).
The data in the Annexure indicates that the core townships are denser in population than the peripheral, and generally newer, townships.
37 There is a mix across core and periphery in terms of the prevalence of backyard shacks, with the older townships of Dobsonville and Orlando East, as well as the newer Bram Fischerville Ext. 7, having high levels of backyard rooms compared to lower levels in slightly higher-income Dube and in the new middleincome township of Protea Glen. There are low levels of informal settlement in the core but high levels in parts of the periphery, including Protea South and Kliptown. Although there are generally high variations in home ownership, the biggest difference is along the edge: from 13 per cent in Kliptown to 79 per cent in Protea Glen. In the core, most homes are fully paid off but in Protea Glen the majority are bonded.
The highest levels of migrants are in new low-income housing areas (Bram Fischerville Ext. 7) and informal settlements (Protea South), with the highest proportion of nonSouth African citizens also in these areas. In general, however, non-South Africans are a small proportion of the population in most areas. In the older core areas, the original ethnic division persists, in terms of first language dominance. Dobsonville, for example, is Setswana dominated, with isiZulu dominant to varying degrees in the other townships. The newer areas are more linguistically mixed, although Xitsonga dominates in the informal settlements of Protea South, reflecting the role of migrant networks in securing entry into these areas. Kliptown is an interesting exception as the largest single language is Afrikaans, reflecting the continued presence of a sizeable coloured community.
There is variation in terms of the percentage of youthful population, income levels and employment levels across the townships, but the difference between core and edge is not marked. The major differences are within the spatial periphery, between the poorer and middle-class areas. Only 26 per cent of Protea Glen's households may be regarded as urban poor (i.e. with an annual household income of less than R38 400), compared with 88 per cent of households in Protea South.
The other distinction is in the levels of servicing. The core townships have high levels of services -approaching 99 per cent in terms of piped water, refuse removal and electricity. On the edge, the pattern is very mixed. Protea Glen and Bram Fischerville Ext. 7 are well serviced but there are much lower levels of service for Kliptown and Protea South.
In summary, there is a degree of differentiation between townships in the core and those on the spatial periphery, but the greatest differentiation is within the spatial periphery between areas marked for the emergent middle class (e.g. Protea Glen) and those where informal settlement is prevalent (e.g. Protea South). The areas are frequently adjacent to one another, reinforcing a sense of extreme inequality and provoking the dissatisfactions that lead to social unrest. There are also divides that are internal to townships and even neighbourhoods. The rise of backyard shacks, in particular, is leading to growing levels of social differentiation within the historic core of Soweto. There are other historically produced divides. In Kliptown, for example, there is the divide between the long-established coloured community and recent African migrants who live mainly informally.
Conclusion
Fundamental socio-spatial transformations have occurred in Soweto since the ending of apartheid. The meaning and the extent of these transformations are subject to debate and context. Two broad narratives apply. The first is of a township that is developing and normalising, successfully attracting private investment. This narrative has been propagated by the City of Johannesburg and is well represented in the media. Its geographic anchor is the historic core of Soweto where positive spatial transformations are easily identifiable. The second narrative is of inequality, state neglect and constant social unrest. This view of Soweto is propagated by social movements such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum and by influential academics (such as Alexander et al. 2013) . The geographic anchor for this narrative is portions of the spatial margin of Soweto, including places such as Protea South and Kliptown. Both narratives represent aspects of a fractured reality. Casting Soweto only in terms of state failure and social conflict cannot explain why the majority of Sowetans remain loyal to the ruling party and why Soweto has attracted high levels of state attention and investment. Social movements require a more sophisticated strategy than broad generalisations of spatial realities in places such as Soweto. At the same time, the state must move beyond its rose-tinted depiction of Soweto and acknowledge that social and spatial inequalities remain across Soweto, especially on the spatial peripheries. The major challenge for the state into the future is to comprehensively address the needs of those Martin Murray called 'the disposable people on the urban fringe ' (2008: 90) . Unless the conflicts in areas such as Kliptown and Protea South are properly addressed, the transformation of Soweto will never be complete and talk of 'Soweto's renaissance' remains hollow. on processes of 'class formation' . However, from its inception it positioned itself against economic determinism, arguing that ideas of class must embrace lived experiences of culture, consciousness and human agency (Bozzoli 1987) . 4 An exception was Stadler (1979) 12 The 17 per cent represented an expenditure of R820 million. 13 Budgeting for the 'marginalised areas programme' included Soweto, Greater Orange Farm, Diepsloot and Ivory Park but excluded Alexandra, where budgets were allocated through a separate programme. Budgets are indicated on http://www.slideshare.net/khanyasmin/ section-6-capital-investment-framework-cif. 14 These included the Soweto Festival, the Soweto Marathon, the International Soweto Tennis Open, and the Miss Soweto Beauty Pageant. 15 See http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/twenty-prioritised-townships-programme20ptp-south-africa-2008-08-08. 16 'The NDPG is driven by the notion that public investment and funding can be used creatively to attract private and community investment to unlock the social and economic potential within neglected townships and neighbourhoods, and that this in turn will contribute to South Africa's macroeconomic performance and improve quality of life among its citizens' (www.ndp.treasury.gov.za). 17 In 2007, 56.7 per cent of individuals reported 'good and very good services' in Region D, which compared with the city average of 43.6 per cent. Notably, it was the only region in the city where the majority of residents felt that services were improving. See http://www. joburg-archive.co.za/2007/pdfs/survey2007_ch3.pdf.
such measures as mentoring, advisory services, joint tendering, preferential access to procurement opportunities and shared use of equipment. 37 Kliptown is an exception. It is on the periphery but is an old township, preceding the development of most of the periphery.
